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per day was operating under
reduced runs as a precaution,
due to damage or because of a
lack of feedstock. Entering
2006, two New Orleans refiner-
ies and the large BP refinery in
Houston were still closed for
repairs, representing a com-
bined capacity of 804,000 bar-
rels per day still out of service. 
The resulting fall in gasoline
production was felt widely in
U.S. and global markets. Gaso-
line prices peaked at $3.12 per
gallon nationwide the week
after Katrina made landfall.
Over the next 10 weeks, U.S.
gasoline prices averaged 51
cents per gallon more than dur-
ing the prior 10 weeks. 
Discussion of the storms’
impact on gasoline markets has
focused on the dramatic de-
clines in production. But the
hurricanes also affected gaso-
line inventories, imports and
exports, and these sources
filled a significant part of the
gap left by reduced production.
Imports and the policies that
affect them receive close atten-
tion in this article due to their
role in narrowing the supply
gap created by storm-related
refinery closures. 
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these sources filled a
significant part of 
the gap left by 
reduced production.
s two of the most
powerful hurricanes in history
moved into the Gulf of Mexico
in 2005, their arrival began a
prolonged and significant dis-
ruption of Gulf Coast refinery
activity. Refineries reduced
runs or shut down in prepara-
tion for the storms, and a num-
ber suffered significant flood-
ing or wind damage when the
storms came ashore.
Figure 1 shows the total
crude refining capacity (in bar-
rels per day) closed down on
the Gulf Coast in the days fol-
lowing Hurricane Katrina’s
Aug. 29 landfall and through
the remainder of 2005.
1 At the
peak of the closures, as Hurri-
cane Rita moved through the
Gulf of Mexico on Sept. 24,
capacity of nearly 5 million
barrels per day—about 70 per-
cent of Gulf Coast capacity—
was briefly shut down. At the
same time, crude capacity of
another 500,000–750,000 barrels
A  Gasoline Supplies: Before,
During and After
The coastline of Texas,
Louisiana, Alabama and Missis-
sippi is home to a large share
of the nation’s crude oil refin-
ing capacity.
2 Gulf Coast refin-
eries accounted for 46.5 per-
cent of crude oil refined in the
United States in 2005 and pro-
duced 40.6 percent of the
nation’s gasoline. 
To examine the storms’ ef-
fects on gasoline supplies, we
defined three equal periods:
the 10 weeks leading up to
Katrina (the weeks of June 17
through Aug. 19), the 10-week
emergency period (Aug. 26
through Oct. 28) and the post-
emergency period (Nov. 4
through Jan. 6). The emergency
period is largely defined by the
time frame in which the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency
(EPA) lifted a number of re-
strictions on the production
and use of gasoline and other
fuels to increase domestic and
foreign supplies. These waivers
will be discussed further below.
Table 1 summarizes the hur-
ricanes’ effects on gasoline
supplies by comparing the
emergency period to the 10-
week pre- and post-emergency
periods. Gasoline supplies are
composed of production plus
imports, minus exports, plus
changes in inventory.
3 First,
consider production. On the
Gulf Coast, average gasoline
output during the emergency
was reduced by 442,000 barrels
per day, or 12.4 percent below
the 10-week averages before
and after the storms. In the rest
of the U.S., gasoline production
rose by an average of 177,000
barrels per day, or 3.7 percent,
presumably in response to price
incentives and emergency pro-
grams.
4
The hurricanes also affected
the nation’s gasoline import
patterns. In the 10 weeks be-
fore and after the storms, over
90 percent of U.S. gasoline im-
ports—composed mostly of
conventional gasoline—enter-
ed states outside the Gulf
Coast, especially through New
York Harbor. These imports
rose only 2.9 percent in the
rest of the U.S. during the
emergency. 
More dramatic changes
were observed on the Gulf
Coast, where gasoline imports
nearly tripled during the emer-
gency period, with blending
components making up the
bulk of additional supplies.
The Gulf Coast imported an
average of only 71,200 barrels
per day in the 10 weeks before
and after Katrina. Imports were
about 25 percent conventional
gasoline, and the rest was par-
tially finished gasoline and
blending components.    
Although gasoline exports
represent a relatively small por-
tion of total Gulf Coast produc-
tion, they make up over 90
percent of U.S. gasoline ex-
ports.
5 Most of these exports
are conventional gasoline
headed for Mexico. During the
emergency period, exports
from the Gulf Coast fell by
51,600 barrels per day (35.7
percent), adding to Gulf Coast
gasoline supplies. Gasoline
exports from the rest of the
U.S. (mostly California) held
steady at about 10,000–12,000
barrels per day. 
Before and after the hurri-
canes, the typical daily change
in Gulf Coast inventories was
an increase (or a reduction 
of supplies) of 12,000 barrels
per day. During the emergency,
inventory fell by a daily aver-
age of 23,830 barrels. The 
rest of the U.S., in contrast,
was pulling gasoline out of
inventory before and after 
the storms, but building inven-
tories at a pace of 67,400 bar-
rels per day during the storms.
Building inventories during
periods of uncertainty—
whether the uncertainty stems
from weather, mechanical
problems or geopolitics—has
become a recognized feature of
oil markets in the past two
years.
6
Table 2 summarizes our
results, comparing changes in
2
Figure 1
Gulf Coast Refining Capacity Closed After 2005 Hurricanes
Millions of barrels per day
NOTE: Capacity is counted as closed if reported as “shut down” or “restarting” by Department of Energy.



















2005the weekly averages of gas-
oline supply sources between
the emergency and pre- and
post-emergency periods. Sup-
ply losses during the emer-
gency were led, of course,
by an average daily drop in
production of 540,200 bar-
rels per day and by less
inventory reduction (9,860
barrels per day). Imports
were the biggest factor in
offsetting this deficit (142,300
barrels per day), and reduced
exports added 66,100 barrels
per day. As a result, the
gasoline deficit on the Gulf
Coast due to reduced pro-
duction was effectively cut
38.2 percent by imports and
exports. 
In the rest of the U.S., a
217,900 barrel per day in-
crease in gasoline produc-
tion during the emergency
was essentially offset by a
nearly equal increase in in-
ventory accumulation. The
net increase in gasoline sup-
plies was only 17,100 barrels
per day. 
After the emergency
passed, much of the appar-
ent increase in production
on the Gulf Coast was offset
by inventory buildups, in-
creased exports and a big
drop in imports. The 344,100
barrel-per-day increase in
production becomes a net
gasoline supply increase of
only 68,700 barrels per day. 
Gasoline Imports: Filling 
Supply Gaps
Gasoline imports helped
reduce gasoline shortages 
along the Gulf Coast in the
hurricanes’ wake, adding
142,000 barrels per day to total
supplies. Imports were also
linked to two policy measures
undertaken during the emer-
gency—the release of petro-
leum from emergency stock-
piles and the suspension of
3
Table 1
Effect of the Hurricanes on U.S. Gasoline Supplies
(Thousands of barrels per day in each period)
Gulf Coast Rest of U.S.
Before Before
Emergency and after Emergency and after
Production
Total gasoline 3,121.9 3,564.0 5,008.6 4,832.0
Finished 3,158.2 3,584.1 5,317.7 5,140.9
Reformulated 574.4 645.0 2,306.4 2,279.0
Conventional 2,569.9 2,943.7 2,996.0 2,859.7
Net blending components –36.3 –18.3 –309.1 –308.8
Imports
Total gasoline 223.7 71.2 978.1 950.3
Finished 86.7 17.6 601.6 549.0
Reformulated 12.6 6.1 262.1 249.0
Conventional 74.1 11.4 339.5 300.0
Net blending components 137.0 53.6 376.5 401.3
Exports
Total gasoline 93.0 144.6 10.6 11.7
Finished 85.3 131.7 8.6 9.5
Reformulated 14.4 13.1 1.6 1.5
Conventional 70.9 118.6 6.9 8.0
Net blending components 7.7 12.9 2.1 2.2
Inventories
Total gasoline –23.8 12.1 67.4 –78.8
Finished –37.3 12.4 115.1 –88.3
Reformulated –26.0 –4.0 –2.5 –17.6
Conventional –11.0 12.5 117.3 –69.8
Net blending components 13.1 20.8 –48.5 9.5
Gasoline Supplied
Total gasoline 3,276.4 3,478.5 5,908.7 5,849.4
Finished 3,196.9 3,457.6 5,795.6 5,768.7
Reformulated 598.6 642.0 2,569.4 2,544.1
Conventional 2,584.1 2,824.0 3,211.3 3,221.5
Net blending components 79.9 1.6 113.8 80.8
NOTE: Seasonal adjustment and rounding prevent subtotals from adding exactly to totals.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Energy; authors’ calculations.
Table 2
Contribution of Various Factors to the Change in Gasoline Supplies
Before, During and After the Emergency
(Thousands of barrels per day in each period)
Gulf Coast Rest of U.S.
During Before and after During Before and after
Production –540.2 344.1 217.9 –135.2
Change in inventory –9.9 –81.8 –220.0 72.3
Imports 142.3 –167.2 19.5 –36.2
Exports 66.1 –36.5 –.4 –2.5
Total gasoline supplies –334.1 68.7 17.1 –102.6
NOTE: Parts do not add to total due to seasonal adjustment.
SOURCE: Energy Information Administration.prices offered powerful price
incentives to move gasoline
into the country. Figure 2
shows the difference in gaso-
line prices between the Gulf
Coast and Rotterdam during 
the period under examination.
The average differential in the
10 weeks before the storm is
88 cents in favor of the Gulf
Coast. The average differential
rises to $8.03 per barrel during
the emergency, then falls back
to $3.65 after the emergency.
Imports: Price Versus
Environmental Waivers
To separate the effects of
price and environmental
waivers, we estimated the
parameters of the following
equation: 
where
yt = imports of gasoline to the 
Gulf Coast,
dt = gasoline price differential 





tors are often criticized for
creating balkanized gasoline
markets, with widely differing
rules on the gasoline formula-
tions sold from one area to
another.
7 These environmen-
tally driven formulation differ-
ences are often cited as a sig-
nificant nontariff barrier to
gasoline importation because
foreign producers are unable
or unwilling to produce gaso-
line for a highly fragmented
U.S. market.
8 According to 
this logic, a removal of these
regulations would prompt
more gasoline imports into
the U.S.
After the storms, the initial
waivers offered by the EPA
eliminated Reid vapor pressure
(RVP) requirements for sum-
mertime gasoline. These re-
quirements would have 
ended on Sept. 1 for all states
except Texas, California and
Arizona, but the waivers ulti-
mately removed the require-
ments for these three states 
as well for the remainder of
2005. Georgia’s sulfur require-
ments, which are more strin-
gent than other states’, were
lifted from Sept. 1 through Oct.
24. These EPA waivers pro-
vided a more uniform gasoline
market over broad areas and
were particularly important for
Texas and Georgia because
they are served by Gulf Coast
refineries. 
Other EPA waivers offered
relief to areas not located on
the Gulf Coast but served by
Gulf Coast refineries through
major pipelines. St. Louis, on
the Explorer Pipeline, and Vir-
ginia, on the Colonial Pipeline,
were both offered a set of stag-
gered waivers (from Sept. 2 to
Oct. 26 in Virginia and from
Sept. 27 to Oct. 27 in Missouri)
that allowed conventional
gasoline to be sold in areas
normally designated for refor-
mulated gasoline sales only.
These waivers were not in-
tended to increase gasoline
output in these regions but to
simplify production and logis-
tics for the Gulf Coast refineries.
They also opened major Gulf
Coast pipelines for additional
import and sale of conven-
tional gasoline via pipeline.
Some waivers were aimed
more directly at the Gulf Coast,
targeting specific cities and 
refineries. The Houston and
Dallas areas were offered
waivers of reformulated gaso-
line requirements from Sept. 22
to Oct. 30. Also, two Houston-
area refineries were targeted to
produce defined quantities of
relatively high-sulfur gasoline. 
Did the easing of environ-
mental restrictions open the
Gulf Coast as a freeway for
gasoline imports? The relief
certainly served to reduce or
eliminate many of the gasoline
regulations most cited as
potential barriers to trade. At
the same time, the post-hurri-
cane spike in U.S. gasoline
4
Figure 2
Gasoline Price Differential Between Gulf Coast and Rotterdam
Dollars per barrel












































= ∑∑ αθ β δ
10
,Et = dummy variable equal to 
1 for the 10 weeks the 
environmental waivers are
in effect, 0 otherwise.
This formidable-looking
equation has a simple interpre-
tation. A weighted average of
recent gasoline imports to the
Gulf Coast is closely related to
a weighted average of recently
observed differentials in gaso-
line prices between the U.S.
and Rotterdam. A nonprice
dummy variable is also in-
cluded to capture the effect of
waiving environmental restric-
tions during the hurricanes.
The emergency period is de-
fined to match the period of
the EPA waivers, and the policy
impact of public stockpile re-
leases should be captured in
the price-related movements. 
The equations are estimated
based on weekly data from
May 2004 to April 2006. Sepa-
rate equations are estimated for
total gasoline imports and for
reformulated, conventional and
blending components. The re-
sults provide a good fit and
significant coefficients and
prove robust to alternative cri-
teria and specifications.
9
Table 3 summarizes the
results of our estimation.
10 The
first column shows the number
of barrels per day that would
incentives and environmental
waivers disappeared.
Imports: Gulf Coast Versus the
Rest of the U.S.
Our description of the
behavior of gasoline supplies
during the hurricanes indicates
that the Gulf Coast was respond-
ing to the emergency very dif-
ferently from the rest of the
U.S. Some of this is not surpris-
ing, given the hurricanes’ direct
impact on production, for ex-
ample. However, there appear
to be wide behavioral differ-
ences in the other parts of the
supply chain as well—imports,
exports and inventory behavior.
One way to determine
where significant differences
arise is to treat the hurricanes
as what economists call a natu-
ral experiment. If we look at
the Gulf Coast as a part of the
U.S. that would normally be-
have like the rest of the coun-
try in its production and deliv-
ery of gasoline, the hurricanes’
effects (including environmen-
tal waivers) can be seen by
comparing Gulf Coast behavior
with the rest of the country. 
For example, Table 4 com-
pares total gasoline production
for the Gulf Coast and for the
rest of the nation before and
after the emergency and during
the emergency. The assumption
is that before and after the 
hurricanes, the two regions’
production responses are simi-
lar, but the storms’ impact 
will make the two regions
respond differently during the
emergency period.
11
In fact, we see that Gulf
Coast production fell by
442,200 barrels per day, while
the rest of the U.S. increased
production by 176,600. The
hurricanes’ impact is measured
by the difference in the two
regions’ responses, or the 
difference in the differences
(–442,200 – 176,600 = –618,700).
arrive on the Gulf Coast for a
$1 increase in the U.S.–Rotter-
dam price differential, or 5,876
barrels per day for total gaso-
line. Based on the average
$8.03 price differential that pre-
vailed during the emergency,
the estimated equation implies
an additional 47,200 barrels of
imports each day. The environ-
mental waivers turn out to be
twice as important as price dur-
ing the emergency, delivering
about 102,000 barrels per day
in additional imports. Our non-
market/waiver variable implies
that the additional supplies
would be 7,140 barrels per day
of reformulated, 40,800 barrels
per day of conventional and
38,860 barrels per day of gaso-
line blending components. 
These results support the
idea that the environmental
waivers were highly effective
in promoting imports following
the storms. To the extent these
results support the idea that
U.S. environmental restrictions
are a significant barrier to gaso-
line trade in normal times, they
deserve follow-up. Their char-
acterization as barriers to trade,
of course, takes no account of
the environmental or health
benefits derived from these
regulations. Imports to the Gulf
Coast diminished rapidly after
the emergency, as both price
5
Table 3
Impact of Price Differentials and Environmental Waivers on 
Gasoline Imports During the Emergency Period
Barrels Daily Daily
per dollar barrels due barrels due
increase to price to waivers
Total gasoline 5,876 47,200 101,750
Reformulated 90 723 7,140
Conventional 2,264 18,179 40,800
Blending components 4,483 35,998 38,860
NOTE: Barrels per day due to the price differential are based on the $8.03 average observed in the 
emergency period. Parts do not add to total because components were estimated separately.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.This difference can be tested
statistically, and we can be more
than 95 percent sure that the
hurricanes forced gasoline pro-
duction onto very different
paths in the two regions.
Table 5 summarizes this
same analysis for the entire
gasoline supply chain, compar-
ing the response of the Gulf
Coast to the rest of the U.S. It
confirms the significance of the
observations made earlier in
the article that the storms and
their aftermath disrupted the
entire Gulf Coast gasoline sup-
ply chain. Gulf Coast produc-
tion, inventories, imports and
exports all reacted quite differ-




The arrival of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita marked a
period of significant turmoil in
U.S. and global gasoline mar-
kets. The focus of the storms’
aftermath is often on the loss
of production as refineries
closed or were damaged by
wind and water. However, our
results confirm that the storms
forced atypical behavior of
inventories, imports and ex-
ports during the emergency
period, disrupting the entire
gasoline supply chain. 
On the Gulf Coast, reduced
exports and increased imports
were the primary vehicle to
offset lost production, filling
nearly 40 percent of the deficit.
Imports added 142,000 barrels
per day to gasoline supplies.
We estimate that only about
one-third of these imports
could be attributable to higher
U.S. gasoline prices. The rest of
the imports were largely the
result of environmental
waivers, which resulted in a
more homogeneous national
gasoline market and allowed




Difference-in-Differences Analysis for Gasoline Supply Chain
(Thousands of barrels per day)
Difference Difference Difference
Gulf Coast rest of U.S. in differences Significance
Production
Total gasoline –442.2 176.6 –618.7 95%+
Finished gasoline –425.9 176.8 –602.7 95%+
Reformulated –70.6 27.4 –97.9 95%+
Conventional –373.8 136.3 –510.1 95%+
Blending components –16.3 –.3 –16.0
Inventories
Total gasoline –36.0 146.2 –182.1 95%+
Finished –49.7 203.5 –253.2 95%+
Reformulated –22.0 15.1 –37.1
Conventional –23.6 187.1 –210.7 95%+
Blending components 13.2 –58.0 71.3
Imports
Total gasoline 152.5 27.8 124.7 90%+
Finished 69.1 52.6 16.5
Reformulated 6.4 13.1 –6.7
Conventional 62.7 39.5 23.1
Blending components 83.4 –24.8 108.2 95%+
Exports
Total gasoline –51.6 –1.1 –50.6 95%+
Finished –46.4 –.9 –45.6 95%+
Reformulated 1.3 .2 1.1 90%+
Conventional –47.7 –1.1 –46.6 95%+
Blending components –5.2 –.1 –5.1 95%+
Gasoline supplied
Total gasoline –201.4 59.9 –261.3 90%+
Finished –260.5 26.8 –287.3 95%+
Reformulated –43.4 25.2 –68.6
Conventional –239.7 –10.3 –229.3 95%+
Blending components 59.1 33.1 26.0
NOTE: Series may not add due to seasonal adjustments and estimations.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 4
Difference-in-Differences Analysis for Total Gasoline Production
(Thousands of barrels per day)
Difference Difference Difference in
Gulf Coast rest of U.S. differences
Before and after
the emergency 3,564.1 4,832.1 1,268.0
During the
emergency 3,121.9 5,008.6 1,886.7
Difference –442.2 176.6 –618.7
NOTE: Series may not add due to seasonal adjustments and estimations.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.Although the rest of the
U.S. managed significant pro-
duction increases after the
storms, much of this increase
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Notes
1 These statistics were compiled from
hurricane situation reports from the
Office of Electricity Delivery and
Energy Reliability at http://www.oe.
netl.doe.gov/emergency_sit_rpt.aspx. 
2 “Concentration of Energy Production
and Processing on the Gulf Coast,” by
Robert W. Gilmer, Carrie Ann Fossum
and Iram Siddik, Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas Houston Business, December
2005. The data used to describe the
Gulf Coast in this article are recorded
by the Energy Information Administra-
tion as Petroleum Administration for
Defense District 3 (PADD 3). PADD 3
contains all the major facilities affected
by the storms. It is defined as the sum
of the states of Texas, Louisiana, New
Mexico, Alabama, Arkansas and
Mississippi. However, 93 percent of
the refining capacity in these states is
located on the Gulf Coast, and for pur-
poses of this article, the terms Gulf
Coast and PADD 3 are interchange-
able. 
3 A relatively minor adjustment was also
made to the data to include net output
of blending components in total pro-
duction. The Department of Energy
reports weekly net input of blending
components (net output with the
opposite sign) for the entire U.S., but
these data are not broken out by
region, or PADD. The total U.S. figure
was allocated to PADDs based on the
difference between gross refinery
inputs and gross output reported for
each PADD. 
4 Weekly production and inventory data
cited here are from the Energy
Information Administration but have
been seasonally adjusted by the
authors. Other data series cited here
for imports, exports and net blending
components are too short to be sea-
sonally adjusted. Because of seasonal
adjustment, some totals will not add
perfectly in later calculations.
5 The Energy Information Administration
does not report weekly gasoline
exports by PADD. It does report
monthly exports by PADD and weekly
exports of total refined products by
PADD. The weekly data on refined
products were used to allocate the
monthly export data to individual
weeks. 
6 One curious result of this hoarding
behavior in the face of uncertainty is a
correlation between high prices and
high inventories of petroleum, the
opposite of what should be expected.
See “Oil Exploration Booms—Is
Houston Next?” by Robert W. Gilmer,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Houston Business, March 2006, espe-
cially Figure 7.
7 “‘Boutique Fuels’ and Reformulated
Gasoline: Harmonization of Fuel
Standards,” by Brent D. Yacobucci,
Congressional Research Service,
updated Dec. 17, 2004.
8 “Gasoline Supply: The Role of
Imports,” by Lawrence C. Kumins,
Congressional Research Service, Sept.
14, 2004.
9 The results used the Akaike
Information Criterion to determine
optimal lag length. Several other crite-
ria were employed to determine opti-
mal lag length, and the results were
tested. The results were generally
robust to the method used. For details
about the Akaike Criterion, see
Econometric Analysis, by William H.
Greene, 2nd ed., New York: McMillan,
1992, p. 245. The results assume that
for each category of gasoline imports,
only one lagged value of the depend-
ent variable is used, but we used the
current and one lagged value of the
price differential for total gasoline
imports; current and two lagged values
of price differential for reformulated
and conventional gasoline imports;
and five lagged values for blending
components.
10 The coefficients in the equation are
related to Table 3 as follows: The first
column is the sum of the current and
lagged coefficients that related price
differentials to imports. The third col-
umn is the estimated coefficient on the
dummy variable that is equal to 1 for
the 10 weeks the environmental
waivers were in effect. All results are
significant at high levels except those
for reformulated gasoline. 
11 In the language of these natural exper-
iments, the hurricanes are a “treat-
ment” applied to the Gulf Coast only,
and the difference in the responses of
the Gulf Coast and the rest of the U.S.
(the “difference in differences,” as
described in the article) is the treat-
ment effect. 
12 This same difference-in-differences
analysis can be carried out by looking
at percentage changes in supplies
rather than absolute changes in barrels
per day. The results provide the same
broad perspective of a supply chain
that responded very differently on the
Gulf Coast during the emergency.
However, the percentage change
results stand apart to the extent that
the differential behavior of Gulf Coast
imports comes in much more strongly
using percentage differences, with
every category of imports except refor-
mulated gasoline showing differences
that are significant at the 95 percent
level or higher. 
7ouston’s economy con-
tinues its rapid expansion. Al-
though local job growth has
slowed the past couple of
months, Houston still is regis-
tering 3 percent job gains over
the past 12 months—double
the national rate. The local un-
employment rate has fallen to a
seasonally adjusted 5.1 percent,
and the Houston Purchasing
Managers Index was a very
strong 64.2 in April. Beige Book
respondents gave no hints at
any signs of slowdown ahead. 
Retail Sales and Autos
Retail sales in Houston
moved at a rapid clip in May,
down only slightly from the tor-
rid pace of April. Upper- and
middle-range department stores
seemed to be doing best, with
discount stores lagging. 
Houston metropolitan area
auto sales were up 5.9 percent
through April, compared with
the first four months of 2005.
High gasoline prices have not
deterred Houstonians from buy-
ing trucks and SUVs, which made
up 56 percent of total sales.
Real Estate
Existing home sales rose
5.1 percent in April compared
with a year ago, and prices are
matching record levels for medi-
an sale value. The inventory of
homes on the market continues
to shrink. New home sales and
traffic through model homes
both increased significantly in
the first quarter. New home
inventories are below last year,
and speculative home construc-
tion is up 10 percent. 
Houston office occupancy
is slowly tightening with the
city’s large employment gains.
Most suburban markets are
H
reaching high occupancy levels,
but still-slack downtown tow-
ers are likely to keep a lid on
rents throughout the city—es-
pecially for large blocks of space.
Energy Prices
In early April, the price of
sweet crude was $66–$67 per
barrel, but moved above $70
per barrel at midmonth. Prices
were driven upward primarily
by tension between the U.S.
and Iran and by a series of
killings and kidnappings of 
oil workers in Nigeria. The
price of sweet crude has re-
mained near $70 since that time.
Crude inventories remain well
above historical norms. Shell
announced that its large Mars
platform in the Gulf of Mexico
would return to full production
by late May or early June. 
Regular gasoline futures
prices were near $1.90 in early
April, strengthened to $2.25 in
midmonth along with the price
of crude and fell back to near
$2 in late May. Gasoline inven-
tories dropped from recent highs
to levels closer to those typical
of recent years. Reformulated
inventories fell to very low lev-
els with the changeover to etha-
nol-based oxygenates. The tran-
sition appears to be nearing
completion without major inci-
dent, but a series of refinery out-
ages has kept markets nervous.
Refining and Petrochemicals
Refinery capacity utilization
on the Gulf Coast moved back
above 90 percent for the first
time since the hurricanes, pri-
HoustonBeigeBook May 2006
marily due to the return of three
large refineries (two in New
Orleans and one in Houston).
Refinery margins, which had
weakened in February, bounced
up to near $20 per barrel of
crude refined for much of April
and weakened by only a cou-
ple of dollars for most of May. 
Downward pressure on
chemical prices continued
through March and into April,
as capacity returned from the
hurricanes, some imports con-
tinued and natural gas feedstock
prices fell. However, major plant
outages in ethylene turned prices
around in May, and polyethyl-
ene prices responded to stronger
demand and higher feedstock
costs. Polypropylene prices rose
as propylene prices followed
gasoline upward. Polyvinyl chlo-
ride prices fell because of the
weakening U.S. housing market.
Oil Services and Machinery
The U.S. and Texas rig
counts are rising rapidly. How-
ever, rigs are exiting the Gulf
of Mexico, seeking better day
rates elsewhere and escaping
the high insurance premiums
demanded because of the ap-
proaching hurricane season.
Otherwise, the story remains
the same as in recent months—
very strong demand driven by
land-based and natural-gas-
directed drilling. Although nat-
ural gas prices fell below $6
per thousand cubic feet because
of high inventories, there were
no reports that this deterred
producers from further explo-
ration or investment.
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